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Before approving a significant technology investment, a board should be able to answer six questions clearly. What specific operational or strategic problem does this investment solve? What does the counterfactual look like — what happens if we do not make this investment? What is the total cost of ownership over five years, including implementation, licensing, maintenance, and the internal resources required to operate the system? What are the exit costs if the investment does not perform? Who is accountable for the programme's success, and how will we measure it? What is the risk to the organisation if this programme fails? A board that cannot answer these questions has not done sufficient due diligence. A management team that cannot answer them has not prepared a credible proposal.
One of the most consequential technology decisions a board faces is whether to build proprietary software or purchase a commercial product. The received wisdom is to buy before you build — and for most functions, that is correct. But the received wisdom conceals an important nuance. Buy when the function is a commodity — finance, HR, basic CRM. Build when the function is a source of competitive differentiation. If your competitive advantage lies in how you manage customer relationships, a generic CRM that every competitor also uses will not sustain that advantage. If your competitive advantage lies in your operational processes, proprietary workflow software may be worth the investment. The build-vs-buy decision should always start with the strategic question: is this function a source of differentiation, or is it a commodity?
Every enterprise technology vendor will tell you their platform is flexible, portable, and future-proof. The honest assessment is different. Vendor lock-in is a real and significant risk in enterprise technology. The cost of migrating away from a deeply embedded platform — in data migration, retraining, business disruption, and professional services — typically far exceeds the initial implementation investment. Boards should require a clear understanding of exit costs and data portability before approving vendor commitments. Contracts should include data export rights, standard format requirements, and transition assistance obligations. These provisions are easier to negotiate before signing than after.
Large technology programmes require governance structures proportionate to their risk. A programme steering committee with executive representation and board visibility. Clear accountability — a named executive who owns the outcome, not the process. An independent quality assurance function that is not accountable to the programme team. Defined decision gates where the programme is assessed against original objectives before proceeding to the next phase. And honest reporting — a culture where the programme team can surface problems without fear of political consequences. Programmes that lack these governance structures almost always experience cost overruns, timeline extensions, or scope failures that could have been caught earlier.
Technology vendors, system integrators, and internal IT teams all have interests that are not perfectly aligned with the organisation's interests. Independent technology counsel — an adviser with no vendor relationships, no implementation revenue, and no interest in any particular outcome — provides a different perspective. For major technology investments, independent counsel on the business case, vendor selection, and contract terms is typically a small fraction of the cost of a poor decision. I provide this service for a small number of organisations where board-level technology decisions carry significant financial or strategic risk.
Independent systems architect and digital strategist. I build digital infrastructure for organisations that cannot afford to get it wrong.